

The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East

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The democratic peace theory has two complementary variants regarding intrastate conflicts: the “democratic civil peace” thesis sees democratic regimes as pacifying internal tensions; the “anocratic war” thesis submits that due to nationalism, democratizing regimes breed internal violence. This paper statistically tests the two propositions in the context of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We show that a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democracy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife. Interestingly, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Looking for causality beyond correlation, we suggest that “democratizing nationalism” might be a long-term prerequisite for peace and democracy, not just an immediate hindrance. We also advise complementing current research on intrastate and interstate clashes with the study of intercommunal conflicts and the democratic features of non-state polities.

Kant’s vision of moving “toward perpetual peace” stands at the crux of liberal thought in International Relations (IR), positing democracy, open trade, and international institutions as peace promoters. Though these liberal mechanisms intertwine (Doyle, 2005), democratic peace theories (DPT) now constitute “a powerful discursive core of contemporary conflict research,” quantitatively dominating this field (Sillanpää and Koivula 2010, 148).

Can the contemporary realities of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) inform this rich research program? Recent surveys among North American IR scholars reveal that while DPT is overwhelmingly considered the most productive IR research program (Maliniak et al. 2007, 29), MENA, though held as the most strategically important area to the United States, receives the least published attention in the field (Maliniak et al. 2011, 459). MENA appears to defy many political theories, and coupling DPT with MENA, the least democratic region of the world, seems senseless.

The Arab Spring, however, calls for rethinking (Gause 2011). Whatever its causes and outcomes, the regional tur-

moil is likely to further an already remarkable “electoralization,” resulting in the holding of more and more fair and free elections. Indeed, while MENA has been all but absent from the third wave of democratization, in the past generation it has gone through seeming liberalization and intense electoralization ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008). Evident setbacks in the late 1990s notwithstanding, recent years have seen an unprecedented number of fairly fair and free elections in the region, ostensibly giving voice to the people through votes and highlighting the need to reassess the possible relationship between ballots and bullets in the region.

This paper focuses on one particular aspect of DPT: its application to the domestic sphere. Domestic democratic peace theories (DDPT) examine whether the pacifying effects of democracy apply not only in the interstate sphere but to the intrastate sphere as well. Several authors suggest that democracy provides peaceful ways of ameliorating domestic tensions before they escalate to violence, engendering a “democratic civil peace” of sorts ([pic]Krain and Myers 1997; Rummel 1984; Rummel 1985; Stockemer

2010). Others submit that democratizing (anocratic) states breed violence, due to nationalism (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Either way, DDPT seems especially relevant to the study of MENA, for the main source of political violence in the region does not lie in interstate strife. To wit, we seek to analyze the applicability of DDPT to MENA, not to establish the possibility of domestic democratic peace itself.

We show that rather than producing a “democratic civil peace,” democracies in MENA seem statistically disposed to greater domestic political violence. Contrary to the “anocratic thesis,” semi-democracies in the region do not show a significant propensity to domestic violence. We suggest that “democratizing nationalism” might actually be a long-term prerequisite of democratic peace, not just an immediate hindrance. We also advise transcending the statist perspective that underlies the typical DPT typology of interstate and intrastate conflicts, in order to examine intercommunal conflicts as well as the democratic features of non-state polities.

1. Democratic Peace Theories

DPT is one of the more prolific and high-profile political theories of our time, and has made substantial strides since its inception, becoming more nuanced, robust, and diverse (Chan 2009). DPT’s “T” now stands for a plurality of often-conflicting theories. Its research program deals with both interstate and intrastate relations and spans three prominent models: monadic, dyadic, and anocratic.

Monadic DPT holds that democracies are more pacific (Ferejohn and McCall Rosenbluth 2008) and less likely to engage in severe war (Rummel 1995) or to initiate and escalate military threats (Huth and Allee 2002, 281) than other non-democratic states. Conversely, dyadic DPT holds that it takes two to tango the democratic peace, as democracies rarely, if ever, fight one another ([pic]Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). Even if extended beyond large-scale wars, to both crises and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Beck et al. 1998), dyadic DPT seems robust ([pic]Dafoe 2011; Oneal and Russett 2001). However, recent studies cast doubt as to whether it is democracy that causes peace or in fact the other way around, or both (Rasler and Thompson, 2005); perhaps the link is spurious,

and militarized rivalry and severe territorial disputes hinder both peace and democracy ([pic]Gibler and Tir 2010; Miller and Gibler 2011).

DPT’s third and youngest progeny is the anocratic model. Anocracies are in-between regimes, neither autocracies nor democracies. In *Electing to Fight*, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 76–77) follow the Polity Score (see below) to identify as anocratic those regimes where the constraints on the executive are “more than ‘slight’ but less than ‘substantial’” often with “dual executives, in which a hereditary ruler shares authority with an appointed or elected governing minister.” They are specifically interested in democratizing anocracies, whose transitions they measure over a five-year period, and propose that because emerging democracies tend to engender strong nationalism and weak political institutions, they engage in political violence more frequently than either democracies or autocracies (see also Sandeep et al. 2009). Although heavily contested (for example Narang and Nelson 2009), anocratic DPT is widely noted and highly influential.

DPT’s three main models are predominantly about interstate relations (Hook 2010). However, responding to the saliency of non-interstate violence, scholars increasingly extend the DPT research program to intrastate conflicts. DDPT imports insights from the interstate models into two main theses. The “democratic civil peace” thesis, reflecting dyadic and monadic rationales, postulates that democracies are much less inclined to descend into civil war ([pic]Gleditsch et al. 2009; Krain and Myers 1997; Rummel 1984, 1985; Stockemer 2010).

The “anocratic war” thesis holds that anocracies are the most prone to suffer from internal, as well as external, violent strife. While some scholars go so far as to argue that elections may fuel political violence in both democratizing and well-established democracies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2001), most scholars connect internal violence only to incipient democracies. Snyder (2000) submits that when “liberty is leading people,” intrastate violence often follows: premature democratization ignites nationalism and consequently political violence, frequently ethnic and civil wars. As in the interstate version of anocratic DPT, here too nationalism reigns as the violence-inducing factor.

These two compelling theses are part of a rather coherent research effort, and are not mutually exclusive (for a thorough review of the literature, see Gleditsch and Hegre 2014). They can effectively converge on a joint question: Does democratization breed or stem internal political violence? Is there a threshold beyond which democratization stops yielding anocratic violence and starts fostering civil democratic peace? Hegre et al. (2001, 44) hold that “if we focus on countries that are at least half-way toward complete democracy, the prospects for domestic peace are promising” (see also [pic]Cederman et al. 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, the nature of this “magical mid-point” remains elusive.

There are partial remedies. For example, not all civil wars are the same, and governmental/territorial motivations may correlate distinctively with regime type. Buhaug (2006, 691) finds that “the reputed parabolic relationship between democracy and risk of civil war only pertains to state-centered conflicts, whereas democracy has a positive and near-linear effect on the risk of territorial rebellion.” Gleditsch et al. (2009) confirm this proposition, and persuasively show that democracies are less prone to violence, also due to higher income and stable institutions.

The linkage between anocracy and political instability is pivotal. When the latter is controlled for, some studies evince the parabolic relationship between democracy and risk of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001). However, since political instability could be a consequence of anocracy and a mechanism for explaining conflict, it may not be appropriate to control for it (Gleditsch et al. 2009). Generally, studies omitting political instability show a positive relationship between anocracy and conflict.

2. Votes and Violence in the Middle East

Can various DPT models, DDPT included, apply to MENA? Few studies attempt to look at DPT, let alone DDPT, from a regional perspective (cf. [pic]Gibl, 2012; Gleditsch 2002; Kacowicz 1998), and fewer focus on MENA. There seems to be good reasons for this. Prime facie, DPT and MENA are a highly unlikely match. After all, in a region largely inhospitable to democratic ideas and practices, chances for democratic peace seem slim. Up until the

Arab Spring, Arab authoritarianism – whether autocratic or monarchic – had withstood domestic challenges for four long decades, making MENA an attractive “control case” for theories of democratization ([pic]Anderson 2001; Saikal and Schnabel 2003) but an unlikely candidate for testing DPT.

DPT, as an increasingly statistics-driven research program, typically finds data on democracies in MENA a non-starter for dedicated research: “[T]he small variance in the independent or explanatory variable (the democratic nature of regimes) hinders our ability to estimate the effects on the dependent variable (conflict or cooperation)” (Solingen 2003, 44). Democratic peace per se appears irrelevant to MENA’s history. Thus, most scholarship addressing democracy and MENA sidesteps DPT and prefers to explicate the “democracy lag/gap/deficiency ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Springborg 2007) or its flipside, “enduring authoritarianism” ([pic]Bellin 2004; Schlumberger 2007).

There are few exceptions to this rule. Several scholars and regime-type datasets note MENA’s modest liberalization/electoralization from the mid-1970s until about 1993 ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Ehteshami 1999; Freedom House 2014; Salamé 1994). This trend (Figure 2 below) and the heyday of the Arab-Israeli peace process toward the mid-1990s produced some optimistic assessments. Maoz (1995, 179) argued that “levels of hostility in the Arab-Israeli conflict are affected by changes in domestic political systems. The move toward democracy by these states reduces the intensity of conflict interaction.” Tessler and Grobshmidt (1995, 163) even predicted that “the overall effect of political liberalization and democracy would be much more positive than negative with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict.” If so, Russett (1993, 134) noted, MENA is one place in particular where a “threat to the theory and the reality of ‘democracies don’t go to war with each other’ lurks,” since once Arab states achieve democracy, the Arab-Israeli conflict may eclipse, and thus theoretically challenge, dyadic DPT.

Conversely, Hudson (1995, 217) held that “the Arab (and Arab/Israeli) cases do not clearly indicate a clear relationship between regime structure (‘democracy’) and foreign

policy behavior [...] to the extent that there might be such a relationship, these cases suggest that ‘democratic’ structures might be less ‘peace-prone’ than authoritarian structures.” Similarly, Solingen (2003, 58) concluded that “even a minimalist, relaxed version of the democratic peace hypothesis cannot explain the big strides toward a more peaceful region made in the early 1990s.”


The scarcity of DPT scholarship on MENA is unfortunate. After all, it “make[s] more sense to study the causes of war and peace among dyads in war-prone parts of the world” (Goldsmith 2006, 547). In particular, the interplay between votes and violence in MENA during the last generation presents fascinating challenges and opportunities for dedicated DPT research on the region. As the least democratic and nearly the most violent region worldwide, a democratizing MENA may put DPT to an important test – and may call for theoretical and methodological rethinking. While democratic peace may be missing from MENA, MENA is conversely, and regrettably, missing from theorizing on democratic peace. Coupling these theories with regional practice, while taxing, may benefit our understanding of both. Ultimately, for DPT to inform Mideast studies, Mideast studies must first inform DPT.

A brief exposition of conflict and democracy in MENA should help set the stage for the statistical investigation. Historically, MENA has been a violent neighborhood. Although the worldwide drop in the number of conflicts began in MENA at the beginning of the 1980s, it remains (increasingly), one of the most politically violent regions in the world. Among the world’s twenty-five most war-prone countries since 1946, eight are Middle Eastern. Since the 1980s, MENA battle-deaths (as opposed to number of discrete conflict) have been on par with the most deadly zones, Central and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, with the latter becoming the most conflict-prone and deadly by the turn of the twenty-first century. Likewise, since the 1980s MENA has shared with Southern Asia the first place among regions plagued by political terror (Human Security Centre 2014).

Recently, the situation has further deteriorated. “The Middle East/Persian Gulf and Latin America lead all other

regions both in terms of total attacks and fatalities, while the former has replaced the latter as the most active terrorist region in the world over time” (Hewitt et al. 2010, 22). From 2002 onwards, there was a sharp increase in violent campaigns against civilians in MENA, notably in Sudan, Iraq, and Syria. The other regions showed no clear trends. MENA’s share of worldwide non-state conflict battle-deaths has increased substantially, now amounting to about a quarter of the total deaths due to non-state conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). The Arab Spring has accelerated the rise of political violence in MENA along three fronts: fighting between government forces and rebel groups (*state-based conflict*), clashes between non-state groups (*non-state conflict*), and deadly assaults against civilians (*one-sided violence*), such as the violent suppression of protests and demonstrations (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Reported deaths from organized violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 1989–2011




Source: Human Security Centre 2014, 82.

MENA’s surfeit of political violence is matched by its dearth of democracy. In assessing the Mideast democratic gap, datasets generally converge. Freedom House (FH) (2014) regards Israel as the only “free country” in MENA since 1976; in 2014, six countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia) were ranked as “partly free,” while the rest of the MENA states (66 percent; 83 percent of the population) are “not free,” significantly surpassing sub-Saharan Africa (with “only” 41 percent of countries,

and 35 percent of the population, denoted as “not free”). The overall average score of FH for MENA (on a 1 to 7 scale, 1 being the most free) has changed little since the index began in 1971. The decline in autocracies from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s (and again in the mid-2000s, and in the wake of the Arab Spring) mainly bred anocracies, not democracies.¹ MENA also remains the stronghold of hereditary monarchies. The Arab Spring has thus far yield a similar effect (see Figure 2).²

Figure 2: Trends in freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, 1974–2014



Source: Freedom House 2014.

The Economist's 2012 Democracy Index (2013) suggests that in 2012 Libya, Egypt, and Morocco transitioned from authoritarian to hybrid regimes, but twelve of twenty MENA countries are still ruled by authoritarian leaders. The Polity IV Index (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) likewise ranks MENA as the region with the lowest share of democracies (currently, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey), the highest number of autocracies, and about the same proportion of anocracies as in Central and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. According to the *Minorities at Risk* project,

discrimination inevitably follows: “For most of the last half-century a larger proportion of minorities has suffered from governmentally sanctioned discrimination in MENA than in any other world region [...] What is especially unique in this region is the lack of any real movement toward remedial actions for disadvantaged groups” (Marshall and Gurr, 2005, 42).

3. Testing Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East

Sørli et al. (2005) provide the most comprehensive attempt to-date to quantitatively explain MENA’s patterns of war and peace. Testing the various hypotheses of the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war in MENA (1960–2000), the authors also pay attention to regime-type. They confirm the curvilinear relationship democracy and conflict (both internal and internationalized internal), suggesting that “the high level of authoritarianism cannot by itself account for the high level of conflict in the Middle East” (Sørli et al. 2005, 156). Our study, which is dedicated to the effects of regime-types, complement this important work by updating it (up to 2007), thus including key recent events – such as 9/11, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – and their vast implications on both “electoralization” and domestic violence in the region. We also include additional variables, such as the incidence (not only onset) of civil wars, and test democracy with another dataset (Freedom House).

Scholars still dispute the best way to estimate the effect of regime type on the probability of conflict. We used binary logistic cross-sectional time-series analysis for our dataset (employing AR1). Beck et al. (1998) propose that binary time-series cross-sectional studies should create a variable of the years elapsed since the last dispute. We also follow the GEE method advocated by Oneal and Russett (1999, 2001), and Carter and Signorino (2010), in incorporating squared and cubed polynomials for peace years.

¹ According to Freedom House, MENA autocracies becoming “partly free” include Algeria (1989–1992), Bahrain (1976–1993), Egypt (1975–1993), Iran (1979–1981, 1984–88), Jordan (1985–2010), Kuwait (1992–), Lebanon (1976–1989, 1992–95, 2006–), Libya (2013–), Qatar (1977–1989, Sudan

(1979–1989) Syria (1978–1980), Tunisia (1979–1993, 2012–), UAE (1977–1990), (North) Yemen (1984–1993).

² Figure 2 excludes Polyarchy, as the latter lacks full data on some countries (such as Lebanon, Yemen), and does not go beyond the year 2000. Compared to FH, in Polyarchy the anocratic fluctuation is more moderate; about 85 percent of MENA countries are consistently autocratic.

The selection of datasets for investigating DDPT is quite intricate. Both Polity IV and Correlates of War (COW) currently seem to provide sub-optimal data for this analysis. Scholarship is increasingly critical of Polity's "serious endogeneity and measurement problems" (Cederman et al. 2010, 377), holding that "skepticism as to the precision of the Polity democracy scale is well founded" (Treier and Jackman 2008, 201). Polity's faults are particularly troubling in the case of anocratic DPT and DDPT (Vreeland 2008).

In light of Polity's problems, we opted to use two alternatives: Freedom House and Vanhanen's (2000) Polyarchy (version 2.0). We recoded FH composite ranking of political rights and civil liberties (each scoring 1 to 7, jointly 2 to 14), so that our ranking starts with a composite score of 1 (the least democratic) to 13 (the most democratic), following the customary categorization of autocracy (1–4), anocracy (5–9) and democracy (10–13). Our categorical coding of Polyarchy follows Ristei Gugiu and Centellas (2013). We added Mideast variables: first, a dummy variable ("MENA"), coding Mideast states;³ second, dummy variables for the three main regime-types (Democracy, Anocracy, Autocracy); third, a continuous variable coding MENA countries' FH and Polyarchy score ("Democracy MENA"; 0 for non-MENA states).

For the dependent variable of civil wars, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2011, 1946–2010 (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011) is preferable to COW. While COW focuses on interstate disputes (including wars) and large-scale intrastate wars (excluding other types of violent conflicts), the UCDP/PRIO dataset includes all armed conflicts resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths. We coded, as binary variables, both the onset and the incidence of civil war. Recent works reasonably focus on onset, since causes for the initiation and the duration of such conflicts are arguably different (Gleditsch et al. 2009).

We followed Stockemer's (2010) analysis of regime-type and civil wars from 1990 to 2007 on a state-year basis. Beyond

the independent and dependent variables, this dataset controls for time, employing the technique proposed by Beck et al. (1998); GDP per capita measures, taken from the World Bank data (in constant 2005 US dollars); national GDP (in billion US dollars); the number of ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups constituting 5 percent or more of the population; income inequality (based on Gini coefficient and clustered as a categorical variable, coded 0 for low inequality, 1 for medium-high inequality, and 2 for the most unequal countries); and a dummy variable for small states (coded 1 for a country with a population of 1.5 million or below). We hypothesize that the richer the country is, the fewer civil wars it experiences; that societal cleavages and inequalities increase the likelihood of internal unrest and political violence; and that small states, which are often more easily governed, are less prone to civil war (Stockemer 2010).

Cederman et al. (2013, 205) find that "access to state power is a pivotal factor strongly influencing both the risk for conflict and its duration." Overall, exclusion from state power and horizontal inequality increase the risk of civil war onset. We thus added a control variable, coding the political exclusion and relative size of minorities, drawing on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009). Following Gleditsch et al. (2009), we did not control for political (in)stability.

We conducted two logistic regressions, using both regime-type dummy variables (Table 1) and the degree of democracy as a continuous variable (Table 2). In both tables, model 1 presents findings regarding world data and model 2 controls for MENA. In both tables, MENA is a binary variable, coded 1 for MENA countries. In Table 1, MENA Democracy and MENA Anocracy are binary variables, coded 1 only for Mideast democracies and anocracies, respectively. In Table 2, MENA Democracy is coded 0 for non-MENA countries and spans the regime-type scale for MENA states. The Democracy variable applies worldwide, and is binary in Table 1 and continuous in Table 2.

³ MENA states include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Table 1: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war, 1990–2007

Variable	Incidence				Onset			
	Freedom House		Polyarchy		Freedom House		Polyarchy	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1 ^a	Model 2
Democracy	-.317 (.5317)	-.365 (.5073)	-.131 (.4549)	.043 (.4052)	-1.031** (.4812)	-1.006** (.4215)	-1.212** (.5464)	-1.057** (.4671)
Anocracy	.275 (.2854)	.083 (.2612)	.160 (.4256)	.147 (.3677)	-.362 (.3017)	-.417 (.2850)	-.963 (.6700)	-.953 (.6539)
Small state	.297 (.3516)	.150 (.3091)	.416 (.3784)	.131 (.3520)	-.295 (.3963)	-.279 (.3849)	-.274 (.4595)	-.320 (.4623)
Number of ethnic groups	.103 (.0695)	.103 (.0692)	.064 (.0970)	.131 (.3520)	.179** (.0893)	.165 (.0859)	.071 (.1149)	.072 (.1114)
Discriminated groups	.468 (.5307)	.719 (.5703)	.720 (.6660)	.932 (.6633)	.303 (.4642)	.311 (.4475)	-.025 (.6357)	.007 (.6283)
Income inequality	.016 (.1476)	.040 (.1355)	.003 (.1560)	.064 (.1527)	-.100 (.1246)	-.099 (.1243)	-.202 (.1522)	-.195 (.1501)
GDP	-3.663E-6 (1.0472E-5)	-5.612E-6 (1.0817E-5)	-1.029E-5 (1.2945E-5)	-1.491E-5 (1.3041E-5)	5.253E-6 (1.7116E-5)	2.550E-6 (1.6347E-5)	-1.884E-5 (2.4780E-5)	-2.080E-5 (2.4703E-5)
GDP per capita	.000* (6.8590E-5)	-5.072E-5* (2.8661E-5)	-9.857E-5 (7.4593E-5)	-4.646E-5 (3.1802E-5)	-6.892E-5 (5.1425E-5)	-5.046E-5 (3.3306E-5)	-2.474E-5 (3.4030E-5)	-2.025E-5 (2.9280E-5)
Peace years	-.900*** (.0988)	-.857*** (.0986)	-.960*** (.1424)	-.981*** (.1472)	-.337*** (.0764)	-.347*** (.0737)	-.387*** (.0948)	-.389*** (.0944)
Peace years ²	.043*** (.0054)	.040*** (.0052)	.048*** (.0088)	.049*** (.0089)	.016*** (.0043)	.016*** (.0041)	.019*** (.0056)	.019*** (.0056)
Peace years ³	-.001*** (7.4445E-5)	-.001*** (7.1823E-5)	-.001*** (.0001)	-.001*** (.0001)	.000*** (6.0858E-5)	.000*** (5.9812E-5)	.000*** (8.5932E-5)	.000*** (8.5367E-5)
MENA	1.089 (.4661)		.503 (.5091)		.247 (.4565)		-.031 (.5508)	
MENA democracy	2.724** (1.0669)		2.585*** (.8674)		2.787*** (.9153)		2.062* (1.0570)	
MENA anocracy	-.044 (.8769)		.478 (.8618)		-.584 (1.2787)			
Constant	.047 (.4943)	.084 (.4634)	.252 (.5226)	.184 (.4882)	-1.886*** (.5513)	-1.775*** (.5167)	-1.114 (.8102)	-1.120 (.7732)
N	2071	2071	1221	1221	1773	1773	1034	1034

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

^a. The variables MENA anocracy and MENA autocracy were omitted from this model because Hessian matrix singularity is caused by these parameters.

Table 2: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war (degree of democracy as a continuous variable), 1990–2007

Variable	Incidence				Onset			
	Freedom House		Polyarchy		Freedom House		Polyarchy	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1 ^a	Model 2
Democracy	-.012 (.0522)	-.029 (.0484)	-.001 (.0186)	.009 (.0155)	-.086* (.0481)	-.082* (.0421)	-.048** (.0223)	-.037** (.0185)
Small state	.196 (.3014)	.066 (.2761)	.402 (.3731)	.140 (.3513)	-.345 (.3662)	-.353 (.3642)	-.263 (.4663)	-.313 (.4671)
Number of ethnic groups	.101 (.0675)	.105 (.0682)	.057 (.0964)	.075 (.0947)	.166* (.0902)	.167* (.0892)	.075 (.1104)	.080 (.1074)
Discriminated groups	.557 (.5509)	.693 (.5744)	.745 (.6561)	1.000 (.6597)	.328 (.4713)	.332 (.4619)	-.118 (.6587)	-.025 (.6466)
Income inequality	-.024 (.1469)	.020 (.1338)	-.005 (.1565)	.059 (.1519)	-.111 (.1236)	-.103 (.1254)	-.194 (.1520)	-.176 (.1499)
GDP	-4.759E-006 (9.6781E-006)	-4.053E-006 (1.0510E-005)	-1.125E-005 (1.2988E-005)	-1.533E-005 (1.3304E-005)	9.703E-007 (1.5028E-005)	3.641E-006 (1.5866E-005)	-1.656E-005 (2.4438E-005)	-1.901E-005 (2.4009E-005)
GDP per capita	.000** (5.5157E-005)	-5.496E-005* (2.9786E-005)	.000 (8.4403E-005)	-5.584E-005* (3.3189E-005)	-6.743E-005 (4.5345E-005)	-5.509E-005 (3.6612E-005)	-2.161E-005 (3.5854E-005)	-1.927E-005 (2.8430E-005)
Peace years	-.897*** (.1001)	-.850*** (.0985)	-.946*** (.1432)	-.986*** (.1491)	-.340*** (.0788)	-.349*** (.0742)	-.381*** (.0994)	-.399*** (.0985)
Peace years ²	.043*** (.0054)	.040*** (.0052)	.047*** (.0088)	.049*** (.0090)	.016*** (.0045)	.017*** (.0042)	.019*** (.0059)	.020*** (.0058)
Peace years ³	-.001*** (7.5422E-005)	.000*** (7.1391E-005)	-.001*** (.0001)	-.001*** (.0001)	.000*** (6.5990E-005)	.000*** (6.1238E-005)	.000*** (8.9362E-005)	.000*** (8.8584E-005)
MENA	.250 (.6876)		.322 (.5766)		-.909 (.7663)		-.338 (.6410)	
MENA democracy	.222* (.1225)		.081** (.0317)		.288** (.1317)		.087** (.0346)	
Constant	.237 (.5026)	.257 (.4910)	.283 (.5502)	.128 (.5132)	-1.575*** (.5739)		-1.029 (.7899)	-1.109 (.7491)
N	2071	2071	1221	1221	1773	1773	1034	1034

* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Our findings – across all models, datasets, and tables – suggest that being a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democracy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent

intrastate strife (Table 2). Conversely, with both FH and Polyarchy, democracies worldwide are significantly less prone to civil war onset, in either a binary or a scale measure (Tables 1 and 2). Anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil wars, either worldwide or in MENA (Table 1).

To further validate our surprising findings regarding the anocratic effect on civil war, we inserted the control variables to the statistical models incrementally. With FH, the anocratic effect is insignificant throughout, even in the univariate model (with just the anocracy variable). With Polyarchy, controlling for time dependency by peace-years polynomials eliminates the significant effect of anocracy. The discrepancy with previous studies (see above) might be the result of the latter using Polity, not FH and Polyarchy, as well as of our control for time dependence using peace-years polynomials.

4. Discussion

MENA's apparent aberration is rather easy to dismiss. First, these findings do not statistically refute the global observation. Second, MENA's (and Israel's) alleged exceptionalism is readily available to explain away this outlier. Supposedly, since this region is so out of sync with the rest of the political world, its apparently odd behavior should come as no surprise and have little theoretical or methodological bearing on DPT. It is thus rather safe to "save" DPT from MENA anomaly.

However, such "defensive" moves expose DPT's theoretical fragility, evincing yet again that "no experimental result can ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counter instances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suitable reinterpretation of its terms" (Lakatos 1970, 116). Choosing a less safe path, however daunting, may be more rewarding – to both DPT's research program and its actual utility. While we may settle for ad hoc "defensive" solutions to apparent outliers, we should consider "progressive problemshift," breaking new theoretical and methodological ground when empirically needed. Below, we provide two suggestions on how to draw upon DPT analysis of MENA to enrich both our theoretical tools and our empirical understanding.

4.1. The Vices and Virtues of Nationalism

The statistical findings above suggest, and the Arab Spring clearly demonstrates, that popular calls for democracy, even the execution of free and fair election, do not guarantee civil peace, and often precipitate violence. The puzzle, however, is causation, not correlation. Mansfield and

Snyder (2009, 381) explain that "nationalism is a key causal mechanism linking incomplete democratization to both civil and international war." This inference is not without merits, but we argue that it might go the other way around: the subversion of nationalism, from within and without, can turn democratization violent.

MENA regimes have since the 1950s invested heavily in "state-building," especially in the bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus (Ayubi 1996). Much less attention was giving to "nation-building," fostering civil solidarity, and making the "the people" as the paramount source of political legitimacy (Connor 1972). However, when state-building comes at the expense of nation-building it may breed rather than hinder violence. Moreover, a viable nation, not just state, is often a prerequisite for progressive democratization: turning a procedural democracy (holding a free and fair election) into a substantive democracy (allowing for peaceful ousting of powerful incumbents), though not necessarily a liberal one.

While some anocracies go to war, others do not. Indeed, as Mansfield and Snyder (2009, 383, 381) acknowledge, "numerous countries have democratized peacefully over the past two decades in Eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and South Africa." What then makes certain democratizing states violently unstable? They point to two sources: strong nationalism and a weak state. "The combination of increasing mass political participation and weak political institutions creates the motive and the opportunity for both rising and declining elites to play the nationalist card in an attempt to rally popular support against domestic and foreign rivals." They define nationalism as a doctrine that "holds that the people as a whole have the right to self-rule," and that, as such, "can be used to convince newly empowered constituencies that the cleavage between the privileged and the masses is unimportant compared to the cleavages that divide nations, ethnic groups, or races" (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 2).

This description drives prescription, which stands at the core of the ongoing dispute regarding the US's democratization policy in MENA and beyond ([pic]Savun and Tirone 2011; Wittes 2008). Since coherent institutions, such as a

functioning bureaucracy and a sound legal system, enable states to democratize more peacefully and successfully, Mansfield and Snyder (2007, 5) hold that “efforts to promote democracy should try to follow a sequence of building institutions before encouraging mass competitive elections. Democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks bloodshed in the short term, but also the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block democratic consolidation over the long term.” Furthermore, since “democratizing nationalism” paves the “pathways to war,” taming, and if possible terminating, nationalism is key to peace ([pic]Mansfield and Snyder 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 260). Only after these two projects of state-building and nation-taming succeed should we advance along the democratization sequence and encourage mass political participation and elections.

Mansfield and Snyder’s rationale is wanting. First, most autocrats are reluctant to encourage the building of institutions that may eventually cause their downfall. To be sure, Tilly’s thesis of the “bellicist” origins of European state-building carries considerable weight in the postcolonial world as well. Threats to regimes, either from ongoing interstate rivalry (Thies 2004) or from homegrown transnational insurgent groups (Kisangani and Pickering 2014) have motivated regimes to invest in certain aspects of state-building. The emerging state institutions, however, are often not particularly conducive to democracy. As Carothers argues (2007a, 19–20; see also 2007b): “Outside East Asia, autocratic governments in the developing world have a terrible record as builders of competent, impartial institutions . . . if the higher standard is indeed the controlling one, India probably still belongs in the sequentialist waiting room, not yet ready for elections. So too, for that matter, does Italy – a rather curious result.”

Second, Mansfield and Snyder seem to argue that anocracies in particular are prone to dangerous greed (that is, actors utilizing weak institutions to gain domestic dominance) and creed (actors leveraging nationalism to wage diversionary war). To the extent that anocracies are the least stable regime-types (Gurr 1974), they obviously present political agents with structural opportunities to wreak havoc. It is not clear, however, whether democratization

drives anocracies’ seeming instability, or whether the latter is simply a feature of some of these in-between regimes (see above). After all, a politically unstable regime is often a violently unstable regime. Moreover, as Narang and Nelson (2009, 360) argue, incomplete democratizers with weak institutions should ostensibly be too weak to initiate or participate in interstate wars, and are thus prone to imploding, not exploding. Still, as Hegre et al. (2001, 33) note, “intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from regime change.”

Third, taming nationalism may backfire. Granted, nationalism has often been abused as a modern call to arms. However, modern nationalism’s core values can provide common moral ground for managing and resolving disputes. Modern nationalism subscribes to “the people” as legitimating both polity and authority through the prescriptive principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty, respectively (Yack 2012). We may debate whether the rise of the Rousseauian social contract at the expense of the Hobbesian has benefited world order and peace, but either way that national genie has long been out of the bottle.

The clash between the state Leviathan and the will of “the people” is not inevitable – nations have engendered states as much as the other way around. Still, numerous peoples worldwide have come to believe that there is a mismatch between the borders of their state and the boundaries their nation as well as between their regime’s interests and their own.

Ethnicity plays a key role in these dynamics. If a multi-ethnic society comes together as “a people” and then a nation, prospects for state-building, democracy, and domestic peace are promising. If, however, nationalism is largely ethnic, then “the existence of a core ethnic group that had served as the basis for a relatively long-standing political community in the past” may become paramount in state-building (Taylor and Botea 2008). Moreover, without such a demographically dominant and highly politicized ethnic core, democratization may unleash ethnic rivalries that will undermine it. A middle road of a multi-

ethnic but nationless state, which allows for power-sharing between its groups, is appealing. So far, however, its record, especially in MENA, has been quite poor (see Lebanon, Iraq). It fostered meager state-building, democracy and domestic peace.

Against this background we should realize why “state-to-nation imbalance” – the incongruence between state borders and national, often ethnic, boundaries – has often precipitated both external and internal violence (Miller 2007). Importantly, how violent the national quest to resolve this mismatch would be is up to the concerned societies – regimes and peoples alike – and the international (or rather interstate) society at large. Taming nationalism – through coercion, expediency, and propriety – may turn it violent, but does not indicate that nationalism itself is.

Finally, nationalism’s call for popular sovereignty may often be a socio-moral precondition for fostering viable democracy. Undermining the national project, even if possible, also undermines the existence of “a people” on whose behalf the call for political participation and representation is made – indeed, on whose behalf the state, in the first place, exists. This realization drives Rustow’s (1970, 350) well-known yet still often overlooked conclusion that democratization is predicated on “a single background condition – national unity . . . the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.” Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 4) begin their *Electing to Fight* by drawing on Rustow’s seminal article, lamenting that his ideas “have not, however, played a central role in much subsequent scholarship or public policymaking on democratic transitions.” Curiously, they then misinterpret Rustow’s key argument as “democratic transitions are most successful when strong political institutions are developed before popular political participation increases” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 3).

Rustow’s emphasis, however, is on national identity, not on state institutions. Indeed, in a later article (1990, 82) he again insists that “an unquestioned sense of national and territorial identity is a highly favorable precondition” for democ-

ratization. Possibly, then, it is precisely the incongruence between state borders and national (often ethno-linguistic) identities that has hampered democratization in Africa and the Arab Middle East: “The colonial boundaries inherited by tropical Africa have created few states with linguistic unity or even linguistic majorities; and amid this scarcity of clear territorial-national identities it is no coincidence that Africa is the region where progress toward democracy has remained most precarious” (Rustow 1990, 84).

Until the Arab Spring, “democratizing nationalisms” in MENA arose largely outside the Arab world – in Turkey, Israel, and Iran. It remains to be seen whether the Arab Spring will usher in long-term “democratizing nationalisms.” This much may be hinted by the demonstration’s popular slogan: “The people *want(s)* bring down the regime.” While most observers have focused on the slogan’s ending – the negative (de)legitimation of the regime – we must also be attentive to the seemingly redundant but possibly pivotal preceding words: the positive affirmation of “the people,” as a singular agent, with the right to tell, morally and politically, right from wrong (Abulof, forthcoming). This may, in the long run, engender sustainable democracies in MENA. The key question is whether progressive “democratizing nationalism” will be better served by keeping states like Syria and Iraq intact or by allowing them to dissolve, “desecrating” the century-old borders charted by Britain and France.

4.2. From Interstate and Intrastate to Intercommunal DPT

Scholarship on DPT has made important strides, and its ongoing controversies reflect its vitality. Until recently, however, DPT scholarship was “caught in the ‘territorial trap,’” as both democracy and war/peace are understood in terms of the territorial sovereign state (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 413; see also Barkawi and Laffe, 2001). Fortunately, new interventions reveal the merits of group-level research on intrastate conflict ([pic]Buhaug et al. 2014; Cederman et al. 2013). Our study underscores this move, demonstrating the importance of non-statist accounts.

DPT’s statism engenders two acute problems. First, transposing interstate DPT to civil wars hardly exhausts the many variations of non-interstate violence. This is of par-

ticular importance in MENA, where many non-interstate armed conflicts are cross-border and the warring parties are often not the citizens of the same state, or are even stateless (for example the PLO-Hamas rivalry). These violent clashes defy the neat typology of interstate and intrastate conflicts; they are better depicted as intercommunal conflicts. Even datasets with nuanced typology occasionally misclassify or overlook these conflicts. The UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts dataset, for example, classifies the 2006 Lebanon War as an “internal armed conflict,” similar to the violent clash between the Egyptian government and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the radical Islamic opposition group in the country. However, whereas the latter was a clear domestic clash, the 2006 Lebanon War was waged between the state of Israel and a paramilitary organization based in an adjacent country, which became involved in the warfare. Conflation of the two blurs important conceptual boundaries. The UCDP/PRIO dataset also omits the September 1970 clash between Jordan and the PLO and the 1982 Lebanon War – both resulted in thousands of casualties – perhaps due to a lack of a fitting category.

Second, DPT’s extension to civil wars focuses on regime-type, but does not address the democratic nature of the conflicting domestic parties. In other words, studies on the “domestic democratic peace” typically mix the levels of analysis, examining the effect of a state’s regime type on internal clashes rather than examining the democratic merits of the domestic rivals themselves. This preference is understandable, since most DPT literature is heavily quantitative, and until recently there were no reliable datasets regarding the level of democracy of domestic political movements. Measuring this variable without referring to formal state institutions and laws is a daunting task. However, considering that the most robust DPT model is dyadic, not monadic, transposing its logic to the domestic level in a monadic form and on an incongruent level of analysis is odd. Few studies have evinced dyadic DPT’s merits for analyzing the relations between non-state actors, even before modernity (Crawford 1994; Ember et al. 1992). The time has come to take up this challenge to contemporary politics.

The Minorities at Risk Project (2008) has recently undertaken to chart just that, beginning in MENA. According to

its data, the number of ethnic organizations in MENA has grown steadily since the early 1980s, from about forty to about one hundred since the year 2000; and ideologically, since the early 1990s there has been a steady increase in the proportion of democratic organizations, emphasizing electoral politics and protests. While suffering from various typological faults (for example coding the Hezbollah as advocating “democratic forms of government” for its participation in the Lebanese elections), this project opens new venues for future quantitative examination of DDPT.

5. Conclusions

Statistically testing DDPT in the MENA context, this paper showed that democratization has failed to bring domestic peace the Middle East. However, we proposed that “democratizing nationalism” might actually be a long-term prerequisite for democratic peace, not just an immediate hindrance, and that DPT needs to transcend the statist perspective in order to examine intercommunal conflicts as well as the democratic features of non-state polities. This paper also sought to encourage future mixed-method research in DPT scholarship, not least regarding MENA. Synthesizing quantitative and qualitative methods may pave paths to enrich DPT scholarship, improving our grasp of its definitions, data, and causation.

This article offered no definite answers, but put forward puzzles and guidelines to questions that are worth pursuing. Postulating nationalism as a possible precondition to viable democratization raises a thorny question: Do values function as an intervening variable between votes and violence, and if so how? The role of liberalism in facilitating the democratic peace has been richly studied (for example, [pic]Friedman 2008; Owen 1997). Conversely, nationalism, to the extent that it figures in DPT literature – mainly in the anocratic models – is typically regarded as hindering peace, which overlooks the potential pacifying role of national ideas and ideals.

To put it differently, in terms of Isaiah Berlin’s (2002) famous distinction between negative and positive liberties: Should the pacifying role of negative liberties (such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly) be complemented with

that of positive liberties, mainly popular sovereignty and the right of peoples to self-determination? Can a mutual adherence to the latter partly explain why democratic dyads are able to peacefully resolve their territorial disputes? And, when such normative common ground is lacking in countries holding free elections, can this lack partly explain their failure to reach a utilitarian middle-ground, or even their resort to a coercive battleground? Answering these questions, via discourse and content analyses as well as public opinion polls, may prove pivotal to advancing our understanding of DPT's causality.

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Supplemental Data and Results

Odds Ratios Findings

Table 3: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (semi-democracies as omitted group), comparing MENA and the World.

VARIABLES	World	World/MENA
Democracy ¹	0.290*** (0.119)	0.303*** (0.126)
Autocracy ¹	0.884 (0.217)	0.775 (0.181)
Small state ¹	0.172*** (0.0846)	0.193*** (0.0968)
Income inequalities	0.996 (0.114)	1.032 (0.120)
Ethnic groups #	1.146** (0.0786)	1.201*** (0.0773)
GDP	1.473*** (0.131)	1.399*** (0.117)
GDP per capita	1.000*** (8.10e-05)	1.000*** (7.86e-05)
MENA ¹		2.124 (1.889)
Democracy MENA ¹		7.409** (7.341)
Autocracy MENA ¹		1.219 (1.156)
Peace years	0.141*** (0.0380)	0.145*** (0.0389)
Constant	1.488 (0.598)	1.211 (0.439)
Wald χ^2	369.90	
Log likelihood	-587	-574
Pseudo R ²	0.488	0.499
Observations	2,711	2,711

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For space reasons estimates of splines are not presented.
¹dummy variable

Table 4: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), comparing MENA and the world.

VARIABLES	World	World/MENA
Democracy	0.908** (0.0352)	0.917** (0.0389)
Small state ¹	0.164*** (0.0812)	0.185*** (0.0928)
Income inequalities	1.006 (0.118)	1.037 (0.127)
Ethnic groups #	1.144** (0.0781)	1.205*** (0.0773)
GDP	1.437*** (0.140)	1.391*** (0.125)
GDP per capita	1.000*** (8.50e-05)	1.000*** (8.17e-05)
MENA ¹		0.856 (0.603)
Democracy MENA ¹		1.262* (0.155)
Peace years	0.138*** (0.0371)	0.143*** (0.0382)
Constant	2.180* (0.884)	1.550 (0.570)
Log likelihood	-594	-581
Wald χ^2	364.32	361.27
Pseudo R ²	0.482	0.494
Observations	2,711	2,711

¹dummy variable

Column 1 in Table 3 shows that when we do not account for regional differences, the incidence of intrastate war in a democracy is one third as likely as the incidence of such a war in an anocracy (other things being equal). Autocracies, on the other hand, are not significantly (at 0.1 significance level) less prone to war than anocracies. This pattern is preserved when MENA variables are introduced in column 2.

When non-MENA states are considered (MENA = 0) the odds for a democratic state to be involved in a civil war is 0.303 that of an anocratic state. Contrary to the worldwide tendency, however, MENA democracies are far more prone to intrastate wars than MENA anocracies. These results do

GEE Findings:

Oneal and Russett argue that using general estimating equation (GEE) is preferable to Beck Katz and Tucker’s method. The results below show that using GEE with adjustment for first order autocorrelation (AR1) does not

not change dramatically when the level of democracy is measured as a continuous variable (Table 4). The interaction term in Table 4 is less significant (0.1 level), but this result still supports the conclusion that the relation between intrastate wars and democracy is positive in MENA states.⁴

alter significantly the findings presented in the article. In addition to the AR1 adjustment, I also included the variable Year centered around 1885 in first two tables and around 1990 in tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (semi-democracies as omitted group), comparing MENA and the World.

VARIABLES	World	World/MENA
Democracy	0.576** (0.152)	0.533** (0.162)
Autocracy	1.163 (0.201)	1.049 (0.195)
Year	0.963** (0.0163)	0.968** (0.0157)
Small state	0.0910*** (0.0497)	0.113*** (0.0619)
Income inequalities	1.025 (0.162)	1.046 (0.173)
Ethnic groups #	1.126 (0.0832)	1.182** (0.0877)
GDP	1.116 (0.101)	1.053 (0.0965)
GDP per capita	1.000* (8.25e-05)	1.000 (9.04e-05)
MENA		1.732 (1.625)
Democracy MENA		229.3*** (237.9)
Autocracy MENA		1.461 (1.064)
Constant	0.316*** (0.126)	0.266*** (0.110)
Wald χ^2	67.11	612.66
Observations	2711	2711

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), comparing MENA and the world.

VARIABLES	World	World/MENA
Democracy	0.904*** (0.0341)	0.892*** (0.0389)
Year	0.964** (0.0163)	0.967** (0.0155)
Small state	0.0981*** (0.0538)	0.112*** (0.0620)
Income inequalities	1.028 (0.163)	1.061 (0.175)
Ethnic groups #	1.124 (0.0845)	1.194** (0.0905)
GDP	1.121 (0.1000)	1.111 (0.0905)
GDP per capita	1.000* (8.01e-05)	1.000* (8.04e-05)
MENA		0.473 (0.468)
Democracy MENA		1.422** (0.222)
Constant	0.553 (0.226)	0.425** (0.177)
Wald χ^2	63.96	74.93
Observations	2711	2711

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4 Here too, I used Norton et al.’s (2004) inteff procedure to assess the significance of the interaction. The results show that the interaction effect is posi-

tive and significant for nearly the entire sample. The interaction is negative only for states with probability of around 0.9 of engaging a civil war and for a

very small proportion of states with probability of less than 0.1.